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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether Deseret Bank, as a judgment c red i tor , 
has a lien a g a i n s t r ea l proper ty tha t judgment debtors had 
agreed to sel l to one en t i t y , then conveyed to another en t i t y , 
such agreement being condi t ional , and in which sel ler re ta ined 
possession and revenues un t i l after judgment credi tor had 
docketed judgment . 
2 . Did lower court e r r in denying a p p e l l a n t ' s 
Motion for Summary Judgment and g r a n t i n g r e sponden t ' s Cross-
Motion . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant in th i s case obta ined a judgment in 
the Fourth Judic ia l Distr ict Court, in and for Utah County, on 
the 7th day of November, 1980, a ga in s t Dewsnups. This j u d g -
ment was docketed in the Sixth Judic ia l Distr ict Court, in and 
for Garfield County, on the 12th day of December, 1980. It 
appea r s now tha t a t the time the judgment was docketed, an 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase had been executed 
on November 28, 1980. However, the possession of the proper ty 
was s t i l l in LaMar Dewsnup and Althea Dewsnup, as indica ted 
by Exhibi t A a t tached to the aff idavi t of David L. Lach in 
support of p l a i n t i f f ' s motion for summary judgment. 
This Exhibit A s t a t e s , among other t h i n g s , t ha t 
"Buyer and sel ler agree tha t a l l revenue earned and a l l l i a b i l i -
t ies for goods or services incur red before closing sha l l belong 
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to seller and all revenues and liabili t ies incurred after closing 
shall belong to buyer." The closing did not occur until the 6th 
of January, 1981, 25 days after the judgment had been docketed. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract dated January 6, 1981, and 
attached to the Lach affidavit and marked Exhibit C, shows, 
among other things, that possession of the property by the 
plaintiff was not to occur until the 6th of January, 1981. 
In addition to the judgment debtor 's having posses-
sion long after the docketing of the judgment by the defendant, 
the option to purchase, set forth in the Lach affidavit as Exhi-
bit A, shows that such option was a conditional option, in that 
it s tates: "Offer subject to buyer, to their satisfaction, 
reaching agreement with former owners as to solution of problems 
with drain fields, septic tank and water system." 
The Assignment and Quit Claim were recorded Janu-
ary 26, 1981, and transferred the interest conveyed by Lach 
Family Partnership to Foothill Properties, an entity entirely 
different than that referred to in either the Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase and the Uniform Real Estate Con-
t rac t . Foothill Properties appears at this date to be the true 
party in interest, as no recorded document shows any interest 
of Foothill Properties reconveyed to Lach Family Partnership. 
As an explanation, plaintiffs1 counsel's only statement is that 
Foothill Properties is "a name under which David Lach conducts 
business" (see plaintiffs ' brief, page 2) . 
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The executory agreement , which was condi t iona l , was purpor ted ly 
to have been bound by a $3,600.00 payment upon an obl igat ion 
of $1,425,600.00, leaving an unpa id in teres t and equi t ty on the 
pa r t of the Dewsnups in the amount of $204,643.98. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The deed from the Dewsnups, dated November 28, 1980 
and recorded J a n u a r y 26, 1981, was to Foothill Proper t ies , an 
en t i re ly different ent i ty than any shown in e i ther the earnes t 
money agreement or the Uniform Real Estate Contract , and t h e r e -
fore would not const i tute a sa le which would prevent the 
judgment of respondent c rea t ing a lien pr ior to a p p e l l a n t s ' 
interest* 
Point II 
The lower court did not e r r in g r a n t i n g r e sponden t ' s 
Motion for Summary Judgment in tha t appe l l an t filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment in which they asser ted tha t no factual 
d ispute ex i s t ed . After an adverse ru l ing they are at tempting 
to now reverse th i s posit ion and a rgue o therwise . 
ARGUMENT 
An executory agreement was entered into on the 28th 
day of November, 1980, s t a t ing tha t the Lach Family Pa r tne r sh ip 
would take an assignment of contract upon the proper ty only 
in the event tha t problems were solved r ega rd ing d ra in f ie lds , 
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septic tank, and water system. In fact, these problems were 
mentioned in the Uniform Real Estate Contract executed on the 
6th of January, 1981, in paragraph 1 of the Addendum to such 
contract, stating that the seller agreed "to remain responsible 
for the repairs and/or modifications to the sewer, water, and 
property necessary to bring the property up to State s tan-
dards . . . " 
Paragraph 2 of the Addendum to Uniform Real Estate 
Contract states that the "Sellers warrant that there are , and 
will be no outstanding liens of any kind against the property 
which is the subject matter of this contract, except as indicated 
in this contract. Should any exist or be placed against the 
property in the future which arose by virtue of Sellers actions, 
inactions, or disputes, Sellers agree to remove them within five 
days after written notice to Seller of such liens.11 The agree-
ment then goes on to give the buyer the option to make payment 
upon said liens and consider such as a loan to the seller. 
This verbiage was agreed to following the actual recording of 
the judgment in Garfield County. 
Appellant asserts at this time that factual issues 
exist, when at the time of filing their Motion for Summary Judg-
ment they asserted the case to be without factual dispute. This 
recent assertion of factual dispute is without any specific a l le-
gation as to what facts are in dispute. Therefore, the appel 
lant should be bound by the assertions made in the Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
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APPLICABLE LAW 
The Kartchner case referred to by the p la in t i f fs 
[Kartchner v . State Tax Comm,, reported in 4 U.2d 382, 294 P*2d 
790, 791 (1956)], leaves a grea t deal to be des i red as far as 
r evea l ing what the facts were in tha t p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . The 
very short decision of Judge Henriod does not reveal whether 
the vendee had pa id the full purchase p r i ce , was in possession, 
or had notice of the ou t s tand ing undocketed judgment at the time 
of receiving his deed. The cases seem to hold tha t a l l of these 
fac tual matters a re important in making a determination as to 
p r i o r i t i e s . 
As indica ted by the a p p e l l a n t s ' brief, most of the 
repor ted cases deal with the vendee ' s r igh t s in re la t ion to j u d g -
ment c r e d i t o r s . Although each p r io r i ty is the converse of the 
fact s i tuat ion at h a n d , it is precedent for the proposition t h a t , 
if the in teres t of the vendee in an executory contract cannot 
be reached , a_ for t ior i , the in teres ts of the vendor in rea l 
proper ty is subject to a judgment l i en . 
As an under ly ing genera l statement of the law, 46 
Amjur 2d, 273, p . 487, s t a t e s , "a l though a different view has 
been t a k e n , there is au thor i ty to the effect tha t one having a 
mere option to purchase r ea l es ta te has not , before the exercise 
of the opt ion, any in teres t in the r ea l es ta te which is subject 
to the lien of judgment ." See Vigars v . Hewins, 184 Iowa 683, 
169 N.W. 119; Sweezy v . Jones, 65 Iowa 272, 21 N.W. 603. (In 
th is c a se , the earnes t money agreement was tantamount to an 
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option, inasmuch as it was conditioned upon the seller perfor-
ming certain functions before the buyer was bound to purchase,) 
See also 46 Amjur 2d, 270, p . 486, in which the statement of 
the law indicates that possession is a necessary ingredient if 
the judgment lien is to apply against a vendee. See also 
Cummings v, Duncan, 22 N.D. 534, 134 N.W. 712; 7 A.L.R. p . 
1510, IB as regards interest of vendor as of the time judgment 
is recovered: 
"The question remains, however, whether the lien of 
a judgment against the vendor attaches to the extent 
of his interest as of the time of entry or docketing 
or other effective date of judgment, so as to reach 
the balance of the purchase price then remaining 
unpaid. 
"Many of the cases cited in support of the rule that 
the lien of the judgment cannot attach in excess of 
the rights of the judgment debtor [vendor under the 
contract] as they exist at the effective date of the 
judgment, apparently assumes that the lien of the 
judgment does attach, and seems to be the view of 
the textwriter." 
See 2 Freeman Judgments 263, 1 Black Judgments 438. 
It is obvious in this case that the vendor had a 
considerable unpaid interest still remaining in the executory 
agreement. In fact, such interest exceeded $200,000.00. Judge 
Henriod in Kartchner, supra, mentions in his opinion that if the 
legislature had intended to include unrecorded deeds, they would 
have stated "real property of the judgment debtor, recorded." 
However, the legislature could just as easily have mentioned 
other interests which are construed to be retained by the 
vendor, such as lands, tenements, and hereditaments and all 
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r igh t s thereto and in te res t s t he re in , as descr ibed in Van Camp 
Vo Peerenboom, 14 Wise* 66. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted tha t the lien of Bank of Pleasant 
Grove, now known as Deseret Bank, a t t ached to the Dewsnups' 
in teres t in sa id rea l p rope r ty , and the lower c o u r t ' s decision 
should be su s t a ined . 
DATED this z% day of August, 1986. 
JL 
HEBER GRANT 1VINS 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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